Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that only humans use language and that language as such has no precursors in the animal kingdom. Moreover, language is quite often understood as a necessary tool for having representations and forming beliefs. As a consequence, by lacking language animals could not have developed representational systems or beliefs. In response to these worries, we aim to mount a limited defense of the MCC as an empirical hypothesis. First, we will provide a short historical overview of the origins of the MCC and examine some of the motives behind traditional arguments for and against it. Second, we will focus on one particular question, namely whether language as such is necessary for having beliefs. Our goal is to show that there is little reason to think language is necessary for belief. In doing so, we will challenge a view of belief that is widely accepted by those working in animal cognition, namely representational belief, and we will argue that if belief is non-representational, then different research questions and methods are required. We will conclude with an argument that to study the evolution of belief across species, it is essential to begin the study of subjects in their social and ecological environment rather than in contexts that are not ecologically valid along the social and ecological dimensions. Thus, rather than serving as a premise in an argument 3 in favor of animal minds, the MCC can only be defended by empirical investigation, but importantly, empirical investigation of the right sort..|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Lawrence J. Kaye (1995). The Languages of Thought. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):92-110.
Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-18.
Jill G. de Villiers & Peter A. de Villiers (2002). Why Not LF for False Belief Reasoning? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):682-683.
Leslie F. Stevenson (2002). Six Levels of Mentality. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.
Stuart C. Shapiro & William J. Rapaport (1991). Models and Minds. In Robert E. Cummins & John L. Pollock (eds.), Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Keith Frankish (1998). Natural Language and Virtual Belief. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press.
Dan Sperber (1997). Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs. Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.
Roger Fellows (2000). Animal Belief. Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.
Added to index2010-08-11
Total downloads35 ( #39,461 of 754,495 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,163 of 754,495 )
How can I increase my downloads?