Cognitive science and epistemic openness

b>. Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism
Keywords Action  Knowledge  Proprioception  Realism  Science  Vision
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-005-9008-5
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Gary Williams (2011). What is It Like to Be Nonconscious? A Defense of Julian Jaynes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
Karim Zahidi (2014). Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.

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