Graduate studies at Western
Episteme 7 (3):248-265 (2010)
|Abstract||Recently, several scholars have argued that scientists can accept scientific claims in a collective process, and that the capacity of scientific groups to form joint acceptances is linked to a functional division of labor between the group members. However, these accounts reveal little about how the cognitive content of the jointly accepted claim is formed, and how group members depend on each other in this process. In this paper, I shall therefore argue that we need to link analyses of joint acceptance with analyses of distributed cognition. To sketch how this can be done, I shall present a detailed case study, and on the basis of the case, analyze the process through which a group of scientists jointly accept a new scientific claim and at a later stage jointly accept to revise previously accepted claims. I shall argue that joint acceptance in science can be established in situations where an overall conceptual structure is jointly accepted by a group of scientists while detailed parts of it are distributed among group members with different areas of expertise, a condition that I shall call a heterogeneous conceptual consensus. Finally, I shall show how a heterogeneous conceptual consensus can work as a constraint against scientific change and address the question how changes may nevertheless occur.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Margaret Gilbert (1987). Modelling Collective Belief. Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2013). Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations. Ratio 26 (3):310-328.
Raimo Tuomela (2006). Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
Margaret Gilbert (1997). Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84.
Raimo Tuomela (1992). Group Beliefs. Synthese 91 (3):285-318.
Raimo Tuomela (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela (1995). Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise. Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
Alfred Moore & John Beatty (2010). Should We Aim for Consensus? Episteme 7 (3):198-214.
Kristina Rolin (2010). Group Justification in Science. Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis. In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Compatibilist Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
John Beatty (2006). Masking Disagreement Among Experts. Episteme 3 (1-2):52-67.
Axel Seemann (2009). Joint Agency: Intersubjectivity, Sense of Control, and the Feeling of Trust. Inquiry 52 (5):500-515.
Alban Bouvier (2010). Passive Consensus and Active Commitment in the Sciences. Episteme 7 (3):185-197.
Robert W. P. Luk (2010). Understanding Scientific Study Via Process Modeling. Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78.
Added to index2010-10-27
Total downloads25 ( #55,710 of 739,352 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,352 )
How can I increase my downloads?