Justice, Contestability, and Conceptions of the Good

Utilitas 8 (03):295-305 (1996)
Brian Barry's Justice as Impartiality is a highly enjoyable and rewarding book. It throws new light on some familiar theories of justice, and shows how the idea that principles of justice are those principles which no one could reasonably reject can yield prescriptions for constitutional design. But I shall argue that Barry's defence of his theory is less robust than he thinks, and more generally that there is reason to suppose that principles of justice are as contestable as conceptions of the good.
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DOI 10.1017/S095382080000501X
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