Parity and Comparability—a Concern Regarding Chang’s Chaining Argument

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):245-253 (2015)
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Abstract

According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates. This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is presented. By assuming the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which is a key premise for the second part of the argument, Chang’s argument could be accused of begging the question. More so, by assuming this principle, the space for incomparability gets severely limited. If these worries are justified, then Chang’s argument for parity as a fourth form of comparability is unsuccessful.

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Henrik Andersson
Lund University

Citations of this work

On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):137-152.
Parity versus Ignorance.Moritz Schulz - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1183-1204.

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