Russell's way out of the paradox of propositions

History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):197-213 (2002)
Abstract
In Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics occurs a paradox, the paradox of propositions, which a simple theory of types is unable to resolve. This fact is frequently taken to be one of the principal reasons for calling ramification onto the Russellian stage. The paper presents a detaiFled exposition of the paradox and its discussion in the correspondence between Frege and Russell. It is argued that Russell finally adopted a very simple solution to the paradox. This solution had nothing to do with ramified types but marked an important shift in his theory of propositions
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References found in this work BETA
Leonard Linsky (1983). Oblique Contexts. University of Chicago Press.

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