Truth and objectivity in perspectivism

Synthese 115 (1):1-32 (1998)
I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications, which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004984312166
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R. Lanier Anderson (2005). Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):287-323.
R. Lanier Anderson (2005). Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):287 – 323.
R. Lanier Anderson (2005). Nietzsche on Truth, Illusion, and Redemption. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):185–225.

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