The tower experiment and the copernican revolution
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2):143 – 152 (1991)
| Abstract | Abstract During the Copernican revolution the supporters of the Ptolemaic theory argued that the tower experiment refuted the Copernican hypothesis of the (diurnal) motion of the earth, but was in agreement with the Ptolemaic theory. In his defence of the Copernican theory Galileo argued that the experiment was in agreement both with Copernican and Ptolemaic theory. The reason for these different views of the same experiment was not that the two theories were incommensurable, as Paul Feyerabend argues, but that Galileo introduced a new theory of motion which he used as an auxiliary hypothesis in his discussion of the tower experiment, while those defending the Ptolemaic theory used the old Aristotelian theory of motion. Already before the Copernican revolution the Aristotelian theory of motion was criticized by philosophers in Paris, who suggested the impetus theory of motion. The later versions of this theory had the consequence that the tower experiment no longer refuted the hypothesis of the (diurnal) motion of the earth. Thus the impetus theory removed an old and important objection to the heliocentric theory. Galileo's inertial dynamics had the same function in the discussion of the tower experiment | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMax Born (1965). Einstein's Theory of Relativity. New York, Dover Publications.
Klaus Fischer (1992). Die Wissenschaftstheorie Galileis — Oder: Contra Feyerabend. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 23 (1):165 - 197.
Peter Kosso (forthcoming). And yet It Moves: The Observability of the Rotation of the Earth. Foundations of Science.
Keith A. Nier (1986). The Importance of Historical Accuracy in Philosophy of Science: The Case of Curd's Conception of Copernican Rationality. Philosophy of Science 53 (3):372-394.
Neil Thomason (1992). Could Lakatos, Even with Zahar's Criterion for Novel Fact, Evaluate the Copernican Research Programme? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (2):161-200.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1957). The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought. Harvard University Press.
Robert I. Griffiths (1988). Was There a Crisis Before the Copernican Revolution? A Reappraisal of Gingerich's Criticisms of Kuhn. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:127 - 132.
Martin V. Curd (1982). The Rationality of the Copernican Revolution. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:3 - 13.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-02-01Total downloads5 ( #160,368 of 549,084 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,084 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
