Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind

University of Minnesota Press (1981)
The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a description" -- Analysis competition--tenth problem -- A reply to Mr. C.S. Lewis's argument that "naturalism" is self-refuting.
Keywords Metaphysics  Philosophy of mind  Causation
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Call number BD111.A571 1981, vol. 2
ISBN(s) 0631133097   0816610800   0631129324
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Roger Penrose (1990). Precis of the Emperor's New Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):643-705.
Robert Wilensky (1990). Computability, Consciousness, and Algorithms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):690-691.

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