David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87 (1989)
Concern about two problems runs through the work of davidson: the problem of accounting for the "explanatory force" of rational explanations, and the problem posed for materialism by the apparent anomalousness of psychological events. davidson believes that his view of mental causation, imbedded in his theory of "anomalous monism," can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. however, it is argued in this paper that davidson's program contains a fundamental inconsistency; that his metaphysics, while grounding the doctrine of anomalous monism, makes impossible a successful response to the problem of explanatory force in terms of a causal theory of action
|Keywords||Action Theory Metaphysics Mind Davidson, D|
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Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The Normative Force of Reasoning. Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
Louise M. Antony (1991). The Causal Relevance of the Mental. Mind and Language 6 (4):295-327.
Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
Karsten R. Stueber (2005). Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
Louise M. Antony (1987). Attributions of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.
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