Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force

Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87 (1989)
Abstract
Concern about two problems runs through the work of davidson: the problem of accounting for the "explanatory force" of rational explanations, and the problem posed for materialism by the apparent anomalousness of psychological events. davidson believes that his view of mental causation, imbedded in his theory of "anomalous monism," can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. however, it is argued in this paper that davidson's program contains a fundamental inconsistency; that his metaphysics, while grounding the doctrine of anomalous monism, makes impossible a successful response to the problem of explanatory force in terms of a causal theory of action
Keywords Action Theory  Metaphysics  Mind  Davidson, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,361
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
Louise M. Antony (1987). Attributions of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.

View all 11 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

124 ( #7,652 of 1,102,698 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #18,256 of 1,102,698 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.