A pieced quilt: A critical discussion of Stephen Schiffer'sRemnants of Meaning

Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):119-137 (1991)
Abstract Stephen Schiffer, in his recent book, Remnants of Meaning, argues against the possibility of any compositional theory of meaning for natural language. Because the argument depends on the premise that there is no possible naturalistic reduction of the intentional to the physical, Schiffer's attack on theories of meaning is of central importance for theorists of mind. I respond to Schiffer's argument by showing that there is at least one reductive account of the mental that he has neglected to consider?the computationalist account known as the Representational Theory of Mind. Not only is this view immune from the criticisms Schiffer mounts against other reductivist theories, but it solves problems that arise on Schiffer's own non?reductive account of the relation between the intentional and the physical
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    Louise M. Antony (1987). Attributions of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.
    J. A. Fodor (1980). Searle on What Only Brains Can Do. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):431.
    Jaakko Hintikka (1982). Game-Theoretical Semantics: Insights and Prospects. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (2):219-241.

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