Online research in philosophy

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. In this article, I explore what logical pluralism is, and what it entails, by: (i) distinguishing clearly between relativism about a particular domain and pluralism about that domain; (ii) distinguishing between a number of forms logical pluralism might take; (iii) attempting to distinguish between those versions of pluralism that are clearly true and those that are might be controversial; and (iv) surveying three prominent attempts to argue for logical pluralism and evaluating them along the criteria provided by (ii) and (iii).

Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity is the first volume to open the window on philosophical pluralism and link pluralist themes in philosophy and politics. It advances recent debates on political pluralism in a range of essays that challenge or defend the association of liberalism and pluralism. The volume is divided into three parts: an investigation of the philosophical sources of pluralism, including an essay on William James; the value of pluralism and liberalism, discussing the compatibility of these ideas; and an investigation of difference in pluralism, with writing on women, ethnocultural, and the public-private distinction.

The overarching theme of Michael Kochin's Five Chapters on Rhetoric seems to be that classical rhetoric is still important. With the help of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Gorgias, Callicles, Protagoras, Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, and others, Kochin makes the case that when thinking about rhetoric, we ought to listen to the ancients—at least most of the time. While the overarching theme deals with the classical tradition, the book's central argument is focused squarely on current rhetorical practices. The proper role of rhetoric, Kochin argues, is to allow "the facts" to "speak for themselves" (164). He attempts to establish this claim by exploring five concepts that are, or ought to be, central to our ..

This review essay is an in-depth evaluation of Michael P. Lynch's book Truth in Context. Lynch argues that metaphysical pluralism-- the idea that truth propositions and facts concerning the nature of reality are relative to conceptual schemes or worldviews-- is compatible with realism about truth. It is argued that Lynch is correct that there are consistent, interesting, and nontrivial forms of pluralism. However, much needs to be done to think that pluralism is the correct theory of truth.

The book falls into three parts each of which focuses on one author and the ways in which pluralism manifests itself in his particular genre.

In a comment on my paper, "Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics" (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confrontational rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.