Book review To appear in the Bulletin of Symbolic Logic [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):480-84 (2000)
The emergence, over the last twenty years or so, of so-called “non-monotonic” logics represents one of the most signiﬁcant developments both in logic and artiﬁcial intelligence. These logics were devised in order to represent defeasible reasoning, i.e., that kind of inference in which reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further evidence
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