Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538 (2006)
|Abstract||An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper|
|Keywords||Consciousness Dualism Functionalism Metaphysics Vagueness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Christopher S. Hill (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
Michael V. Antony (2008). Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Robert van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.
George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
Michael Tye (1996). Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):679-685.
Max Velmans (2009). Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press.
Paul Noordhof (2002). Personal Dualism and the Argument From Differential Vagueness. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):63-86.
Ted Honderich (1995). Consciousness, Neural Functionalism, Real Subjectivity. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.
Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads213 ( #1,448 of 740,538 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,533 of 740,538 )
How can I increase my downloads?