Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538 (2006)
Abstract
An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Vagueness
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References found in this work BETA
Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press. 79-101.
Hartry Field (2003). No Fact of the Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.

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