Abstract

This thesis consists of three essays in the philosophy of mind. Essay 1 contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain that are not in use at a time t, can have no bearing whatever on whether that individual is conscious at t. After presenting the argument, I defend it against two possible objections, and then distinguish it from two arguments which appear, on the surface, to be similar to the argument of this essay. ;Essay 2 takes up Tyler Burge's thesis, based on his thought experiments in 'Individualism and the Mental', that propositional attitudes are properties individuals have in virtue of social relations they bear to other language users. An alternative interpretation of Burge's thought experiments is offered on which the intuitions Burge evokes can be accepted while his conclusions about the social character of thought are denied. The alternative interpretation given, I go on to argue that it is preferable to Burge's. ;Essay 3 concerns Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument against connectionism as a theory of the cognitive architecture. That argument contains two premises: first, that the Language of Thought is true at the level of cognitive architecture, and second, that connectionism and the Language of Thought are incompatible. I argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's defenses of both premises fail, and I provide positive reasons for supposing the second premise is false.