Davidson's argument for monism
Synthese 135 (1):1-12 (2003)
| Abstract | Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically ``hybrid'' events that are consistent with the premises and assumptions of Davidson's argument, but entail ontological dualism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Anomalous Mental Metaphysics Monism Davidson, D | |||||||||
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