Fodor and Pylyshyn on connectionism
Minds and Machines 1 (3):321-41 (1991)
| Abstract | Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have argued that the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. Their argument takes the following form: (1) the cognitive architecture is Classical; (2) Classicalism and Connectionism are incompatible; (3) therefore the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. In this essay I argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's defenses of (1) and (2) are inadequate. Their argument for (1), based on their claim that Classicalism best explains the systematicity of cognitive capacities, is an invalid instance of inference to the best explanation. And their argument for (2) turns out to be question-begging. The upshot is that, while Fodor and Pylyshyn have presented Connectionists with the important empirical challenge of explaining systematicity, they have failed to provide sufficient reason for inferring that the cognitive architecture is Classical and not Connectionist | |||||||||
| Keywords | Architecture Classicalism Cognitive Connectionism Inference Metaphysics Systematicity Fodor, J Pylyshyn, Z | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJames H. Fetzer (1992). Connectionism and Cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Are Wrong. In A. Clark & Ronald Lutz (eds.), Connectionism in Context. Springer-Verlag.
V. Rantala & Tere Vaden (1997). Minds as Connoting Systems: Logic and the Language of Thought. Erkenntnis 46 (3):315-334.
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28:3-71.
Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Systematicity Redux. Synthese 170 (2):251 - 274.
Marcello Guarini (1996). Tensor Products and Split-Level Architecture: Foundational Issues in the Classicism-Connectionism Debate. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S239-S247.
Mark Rowlands (1994). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
Keith Butler (1993). Connectionism, Classical Cognitivism, and the Relation Between Cognitive and Implementational Levels of Analysis. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):321-33.
James W. Garson (1994). Cognition Without Classical Architecture. Synthese 100 (2):291-306.
Robert J. Matthews (1994). Three-Concept Monte: Explanation, Implementation, and Systematicity. Synthese 101 (3):347-63.
Benny Shanon (1992). Are Connectionist Models Cognitive? Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads76 ( #10,578 of 549,013 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,706 of 549,013 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
