Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity

Philosophy 26 (96):53 - 68 (1951)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Locke's contribution to the discussion was fourfold: First , he saw the importance of the problem; Second , he realized that the puzzle cases, the “strange suppositions,” were relevant; Third , he maintained “same” had a different meaning when applied to “person” from its meaning in other contexts; and, Fourth , he offered his much criticized solution of the problem

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
115 (#151,581)

6 months
10 (#251,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism.John Sutton - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Locke on Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke on Relations, Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - forthcoming - In Patrick J. Connolly (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of John Locke. New York: Oxford University Press.
Locke on Persons and Personal Identity.David P. Behan - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):53 - 75.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references