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  • Michael V. Antony (2006). Papineau on the Vagueness of Phenomenal Concepts. Dialectica 60 (4):475-483.
    Phenomenal Concepts in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 68.1David Papineau (2006). Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    1 Introduction 2 Perceptual Concepts 2.1 Perceptual Concepts are not Demonstrative 2.2 Perceptual Concepts as Stored Templates 2.3 Perceptual Semantics 2.4 Perceptually Derived Concepts 3 Phenomenal Concepts.
    Phenomenal Concepts in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 63.4Jose Luis Bermudez (2004). Vagueness, Phenomenal Concepts and Mind-Brain Identity. Analysis 64 (2):131-139.
    Phenomenal Concepts in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 62.9Michael Tye (2003). A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.
    1) There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, Papineau 1993, Sturgeon 1994, Tye 1995, 2000, Perry 2001) . There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
    Phenomenal Concepts in Philosophy of Mind
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