Papineau on the vagueness of phenomenal concepts

Dialectica 60 (4):475-483 (2006)
Papineau’s argument in "Thinking About Consciousness" for the vagueness or indeterminacy of phenomenal concepts is discussed. Several problems with his argument are brought out, and it is concluded that his argument fails to establish his desired conclusion.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01083.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
William P. Alston (1964). Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Peter K. Unger (1988). Conscious Beings in a Gradual World. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):287-333.

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