Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh (1992)
|Abstract||Many diﬀerent modes of deﬁnition have been proposed over time, but none of them allows for circular deﬁnitions, since, according to the prevalent view, the term deﬁned would then be lacking a precise signiﬁcation. I argue that although circular deﬁnitions may at times fail uniquely to pick out a concept or an object, sense still can be made of them by using a rule of revision in the style adopted by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap in the theory of truth|
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