Toward an ontological interpretation of Dennett's theory of consciousness

Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-370 (2002)
While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use of two illustrative examples. A ten-point story that applies to the examples is developed, and it is suggested that the story applies equally well to Dennett’s view of consciousness.
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Ontology  Dennett, D
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References found in this work BETA
Michael V. Antony (1992). The Where and When of What? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):201-202.
Ned Block (1995). What is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):23-40.

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