Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (3):456-457 (2001)
|Abstract||The essays in the book have two main emphases. Regarding the late Wittgenstein, they focus on the idea that skepticism about rule-following is undermined, indeed incoherent, in virtue of Wittgenstein's emphasis on context of utterance and "forms of life" (roughly the "community" view of his later work). In the early Wittgenstein they take a "resolute" position on nonsense, saying that he did not believe there was some ineffable or informative nonsense, but only pure and utter nonsense, including everything in the Tractatus. Although many of the essays are interesting and insightful, they do not amount to a demonstration that Wittgenstein held the positions attributed to him; moreover the positions are counterintuitive, and appear to be undermined by historical evidence regarding Wittgenstein's own view of his work.|
|Keywords||Wittgenstein Resolute reading of Wttgenstein's Tractatus Nonsense Community view of Wittgenstein New Wittgenstein|
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