The openness of illusions

Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44 (2011)
Abstract
Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision scientists propose to draw the distinction between veridical experience and illusion in terms of the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of “hidden assumptions” deployed in the course of normal perceptual inference, I argue for a different approach. I contend that there are, in a sense, no illusions – illusions are as “open” as veridical experiences. Percepts lack the kinds of intentional content that would be needed for perceptual misrepresntation. My view gives a satisfying solution to a philosophical problem for disjunctivism about the good case/bad case distinction: with respect to illusions, every "bad case" of seeing an X can be equally well construed as a "good case" of seeing some Y (different from X).
Keywords perception  illusion  direct realism  epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Louise Antony, The openness of illusions
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 17 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
William Fish, Disjunctivism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Matthew Soteriou, The Disjunctive Theory of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).
Caleb Liang (2008). Perceptual Phenomenology and Direct Realism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:103-148.
Manuel Liz (2008). Substantive, a Posteriori, Type Disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:165-170.
Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Dejan Todorovic (2003). Color Realism and Color Illusions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):49-50.
Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About (One of) the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-04-20

Total downloads

291 ( #987 of 1,096,391 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

46 ( #1,412 of 1,096,391 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.