Vagueness and the metaphysics of consciousness

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538 (2006)
An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false.
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Vagueness
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Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press 79-101.

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