Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument

Philosophical Papers 30 (1):31-40 (2001)
Abstract
Abstract In his book Metaphysics, Peter van Inwagen constructs a version of the Cosmological Argument which does not depend on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He goes on to reject the argument. In this paper, I construct an alternative version of the Cosmological Argument that uses some of van Inwagen's insights and yet is immune to his criticisms. If we suppose that for each contingent truth, there is some at least partial explanation, then it follows that there is some necessary truth that explains the conjunction of all the contingent truths
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