The Self-Predication Assumption in Plato

Lexington Books (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Plato believes in the existence of Forms—eternal models or exemplars of which objects in our world in time and space are copies, and his Theory of Forms lies at the center of his philosophy. But according to the common wisdom, Plato raised the Third Man objection against his own Theory of Forms in the Parmenides. According to this objection, each Form is supposed to have the very characteristic it is supposed to be , and this leads to an infinite regress of each Form . This book defends the view that a mysterious plural phrase at Phaedo 74 shows that the Self-Predication Assumption is both plausible and leads to no infinite regress of Forms. The Self-Predication Assumption in Plato is an essential resource for scholars, specialists, and students with an interest in ancient philosophy and classics

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Plato’s Third Man Argument.Zhi-Hue Wang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 2:197-203.
Self-Predication in the Sophist.Robert Heinaman - 1981 - Phronesis 26 (1):55 - 66.
Self-Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms.Alexander Nehamas - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (2):93 - 103.
Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato.Theodore Scaltsas - 2013 - Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (1):28-49.
The Proof of Pauline Self-Predication in the Phaedo.T. F. Morris - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:139-151.
De Essentia Individua: In Defence of Possible Worlds Existentialism.Barry Miller - 1984 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1):99-114.
De Essentia Individua: In Defence Of Possible Worlds Existentialism.Barry Miller - 1984 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1):99-114.
The structure of predication.Alessandro Lenci - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):233-276.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-02-06

Downloads
12 (#1,025,624)

6 months
2 (#1,157,335)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references