Online research in philosophy

The present essay focuses on the relation between conversation and culture. Through a reading of Plato's "Symposium," it highlights a conversation which reflects on culture while in its midst, combining critique with erotic ritual. Eros, the selected topic of the Symposium, is described by Socrates as a Daimon, a being between God and mortal, whose intermediary state reflects back on conversation itself as daimonic, and on culture as daimonic conversation. This notion of conversation serves as a basis for a cultural critique, on the one hand, of an anthropology that limits itself to an observation of culture as closed and defined forms and, on the other hand, of demonic rather than daimonic notions of conversation.

Since its publication in 1989, David Sanford's If P Then Q has become one of the most widely respected works in the field of conditionals. This new edition includes three new chapters, thus updating the book to take into account developments in the area over the past fifteen years. Part One gives an historical overview of the history of philosophical treatments of conditionals, from ancient times until the contemporary development of possible worlds. In Part Two, Sanford puts forward his own treatment of conditionals.

Jonathan Bennett’s recent A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals collects and sharpens criticism that has been directed at contextualist theories of conditionals. In this paper, I give a new argument for a contextualist analysis of indicative conditionals and argue that it has the resources to reply to the criticism.

I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features of the standard analysis of counterfactuals with the contextual relevance of the corresponding indicative conditionals.

Discusses how to capture the link between the probability of indicative conditionals and conditional probability using a classical semantics for conditionals.

Draft of a paper for the Sinn und Bedeutung 14 conference. Explains how to capture the link between conditionals the probability of indicative conditionals and conditional probability using a classical semantics for conditionals. (Note: some introductory material is shared with a twin paper, "Capturing the Relationship Between Conditionals and Conditional Probability with a Trivalent Semantics".).

Conventional wisdom has it that many intriguing features of indicative conditionals aren’t shared by subjunctive conditionals. Subjunctive morphology is common in discussions of wishes and wants, however, and conditionals are commonly used in such discussions as well. As a result such discussions are a good place to look for subjunctive conditionals that exhibit features usually associated with indicatives alone. Here I offer subjunctive versions of J. L. Austin’s ‘biscuit’ conditionals—e.g., “There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them”—and subjunctive versions of Allan Gibbard’s ‘stand-off’ or ‘Sly Pete’ conditionals, in which speakers with no relevant false beliefs can in the same context felicitously assert conditionals with the same antecedents and contradictory consequents. My cases undercut views according to which the indicative/subjunctive divide marks a great difference in the meaning of conditionals. They also make trouble for treatments of indicative conditionals that cannot readily be generalized to subjunctives.

This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.

I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle—concerning so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theory-neutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, relies on the interplay between the particular theory of indicative conditionals developed here and Stalnakerian dynamics. The upshot is an attractive resolution of the so-called “Gibbard phenomenon” for indicative conditionals.

Preface: What this strange book is about -- Conversation 1: where's the formula? -- Conversation 2: brain and mind -- Conversation 3: logic and intuition -- Conversation 4: how to open the 'third eye' -- Conversation 5: matter and spirit -- Conversation 6: the data -- Conversation 7: synchronicity -- Conversation 8: waves -- Conversation 9: holism -- Conversation 10: the music of the spheres -- Conversation 11: cultural consequences -- Conversation 12: water magic.