Fodor, modularity, and speech perception
Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330 (1998)
| Abstract | Fodor argues that speech perception is accomplished by a module. Typically, modular processing is taken to be bottom-up processing. Yet there is ubiquitous empirical evidence that speech perception is influenced by top-down processing. Fodor attempts to resolve this conflict by denying that modular processing must be exclusively bottom-up. It is argued, however, that Fodor's attempt to reconcile top-down and modular processing fails, because: (i) it undermines Fodor's own conception of modular processing; and (ii) it cannot account for the contextually varying top-down influences that characterize speech perception | |||||||||
| Keywords | Modularity Perception Science Speech Fodor, J | |||||||||
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