A New Look at Kant's Aesthetic Judgment

Kant-Studien 70 (1-4):17-34 (1979)
Abstract
One approach sees aesthetic pleasure as distinctively caused (by interplay of the cognitive faculties involved in apprehending an object) and accompanied by a distinctive judgment (that everyone ought to respond thus). I suggest a closer tie between affective and cognitive aspects: the pleasure is referred to its object, Not simply through causal relations with the cognitive faculties involved, But through itself receiving the very form constituting apprehension in the first place. This avoids certain difficulties concerning intentionality. It also respects kant's claim that while aesthetic judgment's demand for assent is the same in form as that of predicative judgments, One's pleasure itself, And not a judgment externally connected with it, Is what expresses that demand
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