Online research in philosophy

This paper attempts to explore the problem of collective identity and its subsequent historical legacies through a reading of Spinoza’s and Freud’s respective accounts of Moses. In working their way through the aggadah (i.e., legend) of Moses, both Spinoza and Freud find the halakhic (i.e., legal) core of collectivity to be expressed in and as social mediation. Moreover, both thinkers discover that the occlusion of this core leads to a collective trauma (in Freud’s sense), the symptom of which is the formation of the ‘theological-political’ (in Spinoza’s sense).

Opening address, by C.W. Morris.--Address of the chairman, H.W. Chase.--Spinoza: his personality and his doctrine of perfection, by E.L. Schaub.--Spinoza's political and moral philosophy, by T.V. Smith.--Spinoza and religion, by S.B. Freehof.

The terms ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’ are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than temporal parts: an object endures if its identity is determined at every moment at which it exists. We make precise what it means for the identity of an object to be determined at a moment. We also discuss what role the endurance/perdurance distinction, so understood, should play in the debates about time, material objects and personal identity.

The terms ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’ are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than temporal parts: an object endures if its identity is determined at every moment at which it exists. We make precise what it means for the identity of an object to be determined at a moment. We also discuss what role the endurance/perdurance distinction, so understood, should play in the debates about time, material objects and personal identity.

It has long been debated whether objects are ‘sortally’ individuated. This paper begins by clarifying some of the key terms in play—in particular, ‘sortal’, ‘individuation’, and ‘object’. The term ‘individuation’ is taken to have both a cognitive and a metaphysical sense, in the former denoting the singling out of an object in thought and in the latter a determination relation between entities. ‘Sortalism’ is defined as the doctrine that only as falling under some specific sortal concept can an object be successfully singled out in thought. It is argued that such a view is too strong, but that a weaker one, ‘categorialism’, can be defended, this implying that a thinker cannot successfully single out an object in thought without having at least an implicit grasp of the criterion of identity that the object satisfies.

I argue for a strict identity interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics. This interpretation is contrasted with two of leading interpretations of Spinoza on the relation between attribute and substance. In particular, the interpretations of Jonathan Bennett and Edwin Curley. I show that there are difficulties with both of these interpretations. In response I claim that the relation between attribute and substance in Spinoza is one of identity. Each attribute of a substance is in fact the essence of that substance. I argue that the essence of substance, for Spinoza, is identical to that substance. To explain why Spinoza claims that there is more than one attribute I appeal to Descartes' theory of distinctions. Attributes are only conceptually distinct from every other attributes as well as the one substance, thus each attribute refers to the same thing.

Spinoza's avowed aim is to discover and present the essential stages in achieving the life of human blessedness. The most important element in this progression is knowledge, of one's own nature as man, and of one's place in the universe. Utility as opposed to truth of belief will not serve Spinoza's purpose. Spinoza assumes the unity of the human individual without question, and it is doubtful whether this assumption is justified on his own principles. The concept of the human individual is examined first as a system of modifications of substance under the attributes of extension and thought, then as enduring and finally as an agent. The conclusion is reached that unity and self?identity are illusions, but the question then arises: Who or what could be under such illusions ? The possibility of false claims to self?identity is examined and found to be difficult to accept. Nevertheless, if Spinoza is taken as speaking suitably at varying levels of discourse, he has enlightening things to say about the human person, even though from one point of view his enterprise may be seen as self?stultifying.

The article relates Ch'an Buddhism, to Western thought via the philosophy of Spinoza, in particular through the concept of substance. It shows that Spinoza abandoned this concept as a fundamental metaphysical one. The consequent reuse of ?substance? requires a re?examination of the concepts of property and identity. It is seen that Spinoza made this drastic break with Western tradition by experiencing egolessness, the psychological basis for his metaphysical moves. The move is illustrated by the development of quantum physics. Egolessness and a rethinking of identity are basic to a feeling for, if not an understanding of, Ch'an Buddhism.

Of the two main interpretations of Spinoza's theory of the identity of the attributes, in particular those of Thought and Extension, the objective interpretation is now almost universally preferred to the subjective. Rejection of the subjective interpretation, according to which the attributes are merely our ways of cognizing a reality whose real essence remains unknown, is certainly justified, but the objective theory comes too near to replacing the identity by a mere correlation of diff rents to be quite satisfactory. Is it not better to say that Thought and Extension represent two complementary conceptions of reality which are both correct? Yes, but in saying so some commentators ascribe to mind, as Spinoza conceives it, an unplausibly abstract status. An alternative proposal is made as to a way in which Spinoza might be right in essentials, though it requires that a certain tension in Spinozism as to the nature of body be resolved in a particular direction.