A New Argument for Mind-Brain Identity

In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic danglers’ (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental–physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject
Keywords physicalism  consciousness  probability  zombies  dualism  indifference principle
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axr001
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References found in this work BETA
Ullin T. Place (1956). Is Consciousness a Brain Process? British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.
Paul Castell (1998). A Consistent Restriction of the Principle of Indifference. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):387-395.

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