Can a historian of science be a scientific realist?

Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S531- (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces problems. Finally, I suggest that for historiographical purposes an agnostic attitude with respect to scientific theories and unobservable entities is the most appropriate

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Agnostic empiricism versus scientific realism: Belief in truth matters.Stathis Psillos - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (1):57 – 75.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
Testing for convergent realism.Jerrold L. Aronson - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):255-259.
Methodological realism and scientific rationality.Jarrett Leplin - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):31-51.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
160 (#109,878)

6 months
6 (#201,673)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Theodore Arabatzis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references