Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and The Transitivity Problem

Utilitas 28 (4):441-464 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Is the relation ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ transitive? The answer seems to be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey and Frances Kamm point out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. My aim in this paper is to provide a solution to this problem. I will then investigate Kamm’s justification for rejecting the transitivity of the ‘is a permissible alternative to’ relation. Next, I will look at Dorsey’s solution, which involves a reinterpretation of the intuitions used to generate the problem. I will argue that neither of these solutions are fully satisfying before going on to provide my own solution to the problem and arguing that it avoids these problems.

Similar books and articles

Beyond Obligation: Reasons and Supererogation.Michael Ferry - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77:49-65.
Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):333-354.
Divine moral goodness, supererogation and The Euthyphro Dilemma.Alfred Archer - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2):147-160.
The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The nature of supererogation.M. W. Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (4):289-296.
The Kantian Moral Worth of Actions Contrary to Duty.Samuel J. Kerstein - 1999 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (4):530 - 552.
Minimizing Harm: Three Problems in Moral Theory.Alexander W. Friedman - 2002 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
God’s moral goodness and supererogation.Elizabeth Drummond Young - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2):83-95.
The Moral Problem of Friendship.Matthew Angelo Tedesco - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
The Moral Value of Envy.Krista K. Thomason - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.
The moral obligation to obey law.Mark Tunick - 2002 - Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3):464–482.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-12

Downloads
1,059 (#11,233)

6 months
118 (#26,554)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alfred Archer
Tilburg University

Citations of this work

Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.
There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.John Dyck - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):592-612.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Moral reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.

View all 30 references / Add more references