Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach
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David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
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Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
Other editors
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Mind and Behavior 35 (1-2):51-70 (2014)
| Abstract |
A rigorous approach to the study of the mind–body problem is suggested. Since humans are able to talk about consciousness (produce phenomenal judgments), it is argued that the study of neural mechanisms of phenomenal judgments can solve the hard problem of consciousness. Particular methods are suggested for: (1) verification and falsification of materialism; (2) verification and falsification of interactionism; (3) falsification of epiphenomenalism and parallelism (verification is problematic); (4) verification of particular
materialistic theories of consciousness; (5) a non-Turing test for machine consciousness.
A complex research program is constructed that includes studies of intelligent machines,
numerical models of human and artificial creatures, language, neural correlates of con-
sciousness, and quantum mechanisms in brain.
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| Keywords | mind–body relationship tests for consciousness neural correlate of consciousness | |||||||||
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