Duhem on Maxwell: A Case-Study in the Interrelations of History of Science and Philosophy of Science

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:145 - 156 (1986)
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Abstract

We examine Duhem's critique of Maxwell, especially Duhem's complaints that Maxwell's theory is too bold or not systematic enough, that it is too dependent on models, and that its concepts are not continuous with those of the past. We argue that these complaints are connected by Duhem's historical criterion for the evaluation of physical theories. We briefly compare Duhem's criterion of historical continuity with similar criteria developed by "historicists" like Kuhn and Lakatos. We argue that Duhem's rejection of theoretical pluralism was a primary factor preventing him from recognizing Maxwell's work as an autonomous tradition.

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Roger Ariew
University of South Florida

Citations of this work

Duhem on Good Sense and Theory Pursuit: From Virtue to Social Epistemology.Jamie Shaw - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):67-85.
Pierre Duhem.Roger Ariew - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hidden Underdetermination: A Case Study in Classical Electrodynamics.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):125-151.

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