Advisors and Deliberation

Journal of Ethics 15 (4):405-424 (2011)
The paper has two goals. First, it defends one type of subjectivist account of reasons for actions—deliberative accounts—against the criticism that they commit the conditional fallacy. Second, it attempts to show that another type of subjectivist account of practical reasons that has been gaining popularity—ideal advisor accounts—are liable to commit a closely related error. Further, I argue that ideal advisor accounts can avoid the error only by accepting the fundamental theoretical motivation behind deliberative accounts. I conclude that ideal advisor accounts represent neither a substantial departure from, nor a substantial improvement upon, deliberative accounts
Keywords Reasons  Ideal Advisor  Bernard Williams  advice model  Michael Smith
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-011-9101-7
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Williams (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Peter Railton (1986). Moral Realism. Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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Robert N. Johnson (1997). Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):619-625.
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