Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner (2010). Ambiguity Aversion: The Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 172 (1).Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psychological effect: ambiguity aversion . The ‘comparative ignorance’ hypothesis articulates how this effect works and explains why it is important to an understanding of the typical pattern of responses associated with Ellsberg’s two-color problem. In the first part of this article we challenge Fox and Tversky’s explanation. We present first an experiment that extends Ellsberg’s two-color problem where certain predictions of the comparative ignorance hypothesis are not confirmed. In addition the hypothesis seems unable to explain how the subjects resolve trade-offs between security and expected pay-off when vagueness is present. Ellsberg offered an explanation of the typical behavior elicited by his examples in terms of these trade-offs and in section three we offer a model of Ellsberg’s trade-offs. The model takes seriously the role of imprecise probabilities in explaining Ellsberg’s phenomenon. The so-called three-color problem was also considered in Fox and Tversky (1995). We argue that Fox and Tversky’s analysis of this case breaks a symmetry with their analysis of the two-color problem. We propose a unified treatment of both problems and we present a experiment that confirms our hypothesis.
Similar books and articles
Optimal protective responses to long-term risks depend on rational perceptions of ambiguous risks and uncertain time horizons. Our study examined the joint influence of uncertain delay and risk in an original sample of business owners and managers. We found that many subjects disliked uncertainty in the timing of an outcome, a reaction we term ``lottery timing risk aversion.'' Such aversion to uncertain timing was positively related to aversion to ambiguous probabilities for lotteries involving storm damage risks. This association suggests that uncertainty may be processed similarly in both the risk and time dimensions.
No categories
The disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992) occurs when decision makers prefer option x (versus y) when knowing that event A occurs and also when knowing that event A does not occur, but they refuse x (or prefer y) when not knowing whether or not A occurs. This form of incoherence violates Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle, one of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision making. The phenomenon was attributed to a lack of clear reasons for accepting an option (x) when subjects are under uncertainty. Through a pragmatic analysis of the task and a consequent reformulation of it, we show that the effect does not depend on the presence of uncertainty, but on the introduction of non-relevant goals into the text problem, in both the well-known Gamble problem and the Hawaii problem.
In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) Hertwig et al. draw a distinction between decisions from experience and decisions from description. In a decision from experience an agent does not have a summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. A career choice, deciding whether to back up a computer hard drive, cross a busy street, etc., are typical examples of decisions from experience. In such decisions agents can rely only of their encounters with the corresponding prospects. By contrast, an agent furnished with information sources such as drug-package inserts or mutual-fund brochures—all of which describe risky prospects—will often make decisions from description. In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) it is shown (empirically) that decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. Most of these results (summarized and analyzed in (Hertwig, 2009)) are concerned with the role of risk in decision making. This article presents some preliminary results concerning the role of uncertainty in decision-making. We focus on Ellsberg’s two-color problem and consider a chance setup based on double sampling. We report empirical results which indicate that decisions from description where subjects select between a clear urn, the chance setup based on double sampling and Ellsberg’s vague urn, are such that subjects perceive the chance setup at least as an intermediate option between clear and vague choices (and there is evidence indicating that the double sampling chance setup is seen as operationally indistinguishable from the vague urn). We then suggest how the iterated chance setup can be used in order to study decisions from experience in the case of uncertainty.
Ellsberg's (1961) famous paradox shows that decision-makers give events with âknownâ probabilities a higher weight in their outcome evaluation. In the same article, Ellsberg suggests a preference representation which has intuitive appeal but lacks an axiomatic foundation. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) provide an axiomatisation for expected utility with non-additive probabilities. This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is the Ellsberg representation. The paper further explores properties of this representation of beliefs and provides an axiomatisation for them.
No categories
The Ellsberg Paradox documented the aversion to ambiguity in the probability of winning a prize. Using an original sample of 266 business owners and managers facing risks from climate change, this paper documents the presence of departures from rationality in both directions. Both ambiguity-seeking behavior and ambiguity-averse behavior are evident. People exhibit âfearâ effects of ambiguity for small probabilities of suffering a loss and âhopeâ effects for large probabilities. Estimates of the crossover point from ambiguity aversion (fear) to ambiguity seeking (hope) place this value between 0.3 and 0.7 for the risk per decade lotteries considered, with empirical estimates indicating a crossover mean risk of about 0.5. Attitudes toward the degree of ambiguity also reverse at the crossover point.
No categories
We postulate the Testing Principle : that individuals ''act like statisticians'' when they face uncertainty in a decision problem, ranking alternatives to the extent that available evidence allows. The Testing Principle implies that completeness of preferences, rather than the sure-thing principle , is violated in the Ellsberg Paradox. In the experiment, subjects chose between risky and uncertain acts in modified Ellsberg-type urn problems, with sample information about the uncertain urn. Our results show, consistent with the Testing Principle, that the uncertain urn is chosen more often when the sample size is larger, holding constant a measure of ambiguity (proportion of balls of unknown colour in the urn). The Testing Principle rationalises the Ellsberg Paradox. Behaviour consistent with the principle leads to a reduction in Ellsberg-type violations as the statistical quality of sample information is improved, holding ambiguity constant. The Testing Principle also provides a normative rationale for the Ellsberg paradox that is consistent with procedural rationality.
I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief (as opposed to “imprecise” belief), such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain how an agent may come to have unique preferences for each of the Ellsberg options. Levi (1986, Hard choices: Decision making under unresolved conflict. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) holds that the extra element amounts to innocuous secondary “risk” or security considerations that are used to break ties when more than one option is rationally permissible. While I think a lexical choice rule of this kind is very plausible, I argue that it involves a greater break with xpected utility theory than mere violation of the ordering axiom.
Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, 643–669 (1961); Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, Garland Publishing (2001)) argued that uncertainty is not reducible to risk. At the center of Ellsberg’s argument lies a thought experiment that has come to be known as the three-color example. It has been observed that a significant number of sophisticated decision makers violate the requirements of subjective expected utility theory when they are confronted with Ellsberg’s three-color example. More generally, such decision makers are in conflict with either the ordering assumption or the independence assumption of subjective expected utility theory. While a clear majority of the theoretical responses to these violations have advocated maintaining ordering while relaxing independence, a persistent minority has advocated abandoning the ordering assumption. The purpose of this paper is to consider a similar dilemma that exists within the context of multiattribute models, where it arises by considering indeterminacy in the weighting of attributes rather than indeterminacy in the determination of probabilities as in Ellsberg’s example.
Building on work that we reported at ISIPTA 2005 we revisit claims made by Fox and Tversky concerning their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis for decision making under uncertainty.
No categories
The "Ellsberg phenomenon" has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [5] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and present empirical work suggesting an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg's own diagnosis.
No categories
Discussion of Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner, Ambiguity aversion: The explanatory power of indeterminate probabilities
|
|
There are no threads in this forum |
Nothing in this forum yet.

