Models of preference reversals and personal rules: Do they require maximizing a utility function with a specific structure?
Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651 (2005)
|Abstract||One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.|
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