Topoi 5 (1):3-19 (1986)
|Abstract||The primary aim of this paper is the presentation of a foundation for causal decision theory. This is worth doing because causal decision theory (CDT) is philosophically the most adequate rational decision theory now available. I will not defend that claim here by elaborate comparison of the theory with all its competitors, but by providing the foundation. This puts the theory on an equal footing with competitors for which foundations have already been given. It turns out that it will also produce a reply to the most serious objections made so far against CDT and against the particular version of CDT I will defend|
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