A Materialist Theory of the Mind

Routledge (1968)
Abstract
This classic work of recent philosophy was first published in 1968, and remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind , D. M. Armstrong provided insight into the debate surrounding the relationship of the mind and body. He put forth a detailed materialist account of all the main mental phenomena, including perception, sensation, belief, the will, introspection, mental images, and consciousness. This causal analysis of mental concepts, along with the similar theory by David Lewis, has come to dominate all subsequent debates in the philosophy of mind. In the preface to this updated edition, Armstrong reflects on the impact of the book, and places it in the context of subsequent developments. A full bibliography of all the key writings that have appeared in the materialist debate is also provided
Keywords Attribute  Behaviorism  Belief  Dualism  Introspection  Knowledge  Mental Image  Mind  Perception  Philosophical Anthropology  Sensation  Will  Ryle, G
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Call number BF161.A72 1993
ISBN(s) 0415100313   9780415100311
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Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.

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