David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608 (2001)
Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism
|Keywords||dialetheism deflationism Liar paradox truth|
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford University Press.
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
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Citations of this work BETA
Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). Deflationism (About Theories of Truth). Philosophy Compass 7 (4):267-277.
Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth. Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.
Douglas Eden Patterson (2006). Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T. Synthese 151 (1):1 - 32.
Douglas Eden Patterson (2006). Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T. Synthese 151 (1):1-32.
Similar books and articles
Keith Simmons (1987). On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
Lionel Shapiro (2011). Deflating Logical Consequence. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
Keith Simmons (1999). Deflationary Truth and the Liar. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
JC Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (2003). Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Noûs 37 (2):303–324.
Kevin Scharp (2010). Truth's Saviour? [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):183 - 188.
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Keith Simmons (1993). Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge University Press.
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