David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608 (2001)
Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism
|Keywords||dialetheism deflationism Liar paradox truth|
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Citations of this work BETA
Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). Deflationism (About Theories of Truth). Philosophy Compass 7 (4):267-277.
Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth. Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.
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Keith Simmons (1987). On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.
JC Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (2003). Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Noûs 37 (2):303–324.
J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Keith Simmons (1999). Deflationary Truth and the Liar. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
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Keith Simmons (1993). Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge University Press.
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