David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93 (1973)
A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind
|Keywords||Epistemology Materialism Metaphysics Mind Minds|
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William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
William G. Lycan (2013). On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.
Peter Slezak (1986). Actions, Cognition and the Self. Synthese 66 (3):405 - 435.
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