Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93 (1973)
|Abstract||A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind|
|Keywords||Epistemology Materialism Metaphysics Mind Minds|
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