Infinite regress arguments and the problem of universals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):191 – 201 (1974)
What is it for a particular to have a property? many proposed analyses of this situation may be called relational accounts. The particular has some relation, R, To some entity p. R may be the relation of falling under, Being a member of, Resembling or "participating." p may be a predicate, A concept, A class, A paradigm instance or a form. A number of arguments seek to prove that all these accounts are involved in various vicious infinite regresses. These arguments are classified, Their resemblances and differences noted, And their soundness assessed. (edited)
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DOI 10.1080/00048407412341211
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References found in this work BETA
H. H. Price (1954). Thinking and Experience. Philosophical Review 63 (1):93-98.

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Citations of this work BETA
Graham Nerlich (1976). Universals: Escaping Armstrong's Regresses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):58 – 64.

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