Infinite regress arguments and the problem of universals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):191 – 201 (1974)
Abstract
What is it for a particular to have a property? many proposed analyses of this situation may be called relational accounts. The particular has some relation, R, To some entity p. R may be the relation of falling under, Being a member of, Resembling or "participating." p may be a predicate, A concept, A class, A paradigm instance or a form. A number of arguments seek to prove that all these accounts are involved in various vicious infinite regresses. These arguments are classified, Their resemblances and differences noted, And their soundness assessed. (edited)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,361
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Graham Nerlich (1976). Universals: Escaping Armstrong's Regresses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):58 – 64.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

128 ( #7,178 of 1,102,698 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #36,550 of 1,102,698 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.