Is there a dutch book argument for probability kinematics?

Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588 (1980)
Abstract
Dutch Book arguments have been presented for static belief systems and for belief change by conditionalization. An argument is given here that a rule for belief change which under certain conditions violates probability kinematics will leave the agent open to a Dutch Book
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Citations of this work BETA
Jordan Howard Sobel (1987). Self-Doubts and Dutch Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):56 – 81.
Brian Skyrms (1987). Updating, Supposing, and Maxent. Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.
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