Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):383 – 401 (2003)
|Abstract||Minimalists, following Horwich, claim that all that can be said about truth is comprised by all and only the nonparadoxical instances of (E) p is true iff p. It is, accordingly, standard in the literature on truth and paradox to ask how the minimalist will restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences (alternatively: propositions). In this paper, we consider a prior question: On what grounds does the minimalist restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences and, thereby, avoid contradictions? We argue that there is no good reason for thinking that the minimalist can furnish such grounds. Accordingly, while we are tempted to conclude from this that the minimalist should acknowledge the contradictoriness of truth, instead, we end with a challenge: Provide grounds, compatible with minimalism, for banning the paradoxical instances of (E), or embrace dialetheism.|
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