Max Deutscher and perception

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249 (1963)
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Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Knowledge  Perception  Reasons  Armstrong, D  Deutscher, M
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DOI 10.1080/00048406312341221
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