No consistent way with paradox

Analysis 72 (1):66-75 (2012)
Abstract
In ‘A Consistent Way with Paradox’, Laurence Goldstein (2009) clarifies his solution to the liar, which he touts as revenge immune . In addition, he (Ibid.) responds to one of the objections that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2006) raise against certain solutions to the open pair and argues that his proffered solution to the liar family of paradoxes undermines what they (Ibid.) call the dialetheic conjecture . In this paper, after critically evaluating Goldstein’s response to A-G&W, I turn to his proposed solution to the liar paradox, where I show that it is difficult to see how it manages to avoid that conjecture
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Laurence Goldstein (2009). A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.
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