Revisions and quiddities
| Abstract | I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of affairs (Russell’s facts in his great Lectures on Logical Atomism) that unite particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesThomas Hurka (2007). Liability and Just Cause. Ethics and International Affairs 21 (2):199–218.
Jacek Wojtysiak (2007). On the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):111-135.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Quiddistic Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):1-32.
Joan Pagès (2002). Structural Universals and Formal Relations. Synthese 131 (2):215 - 221.
Peter Forrest (2006). The Operator Theory of Instantiation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):213 – 228.
Peter Gärdenfors (1986). The Dynamics of Belief: Contractions and Revisions of Probability Functions. Topoi 5 (1):29-37.
Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
Philipp Keller (2007). A World of Truthmakers. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag.
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
John Bolender (2006). Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which Are Basic and Which Are Derived? Philosophia 34 (4):405-410.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-08-21Total downloads58 ( #16,906 of 549,699 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,699 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
