Stakes and beliefs

Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87 (2010)
The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant , though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments.
Keywords Belief  Stakes  Degrees of belief  Partial belief  Categorical belief  Stake-sensitive  Stake-invariant  Ramsey  Skyrms  Dutch book  Package principle
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DOI 10.2307/40542421
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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