Semantic defectiveness and the liar

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863 (2013)
In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
Keywords Truth  Liar paradox  Pretense  Expressibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9915-6
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References found in this work BETA
James A. Woodbridge (2005). Truth as a Pretense. In Mark Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 134.

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Jay Newhard (2005). Grelling's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):1 - 27.
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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